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Abstract 
This study was commissioned and supervised by the European Parliament’s 
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs at the request of the 
AFCO Committee. It addresses the potentials and challenges of the 
implementation of Internet voting in European Parliament elections. It considers 
the social, political, legal, and technological implications of its introduction as an 
alternative to on-paper ballot and builds on the recent experience of previous 
trials and successful e-enabled elections to issue technical recommendations 
regarding Internet voting in the European Union.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This report analyses the opportunities of Internet voting and its challenges, namely with 
regard to legal constraints, political and social implications, and technological and security 
challenges, discussing the merits of this solution and possible pathways to eliminate threats 
or minimise their effects. It builds on the latest academic research on the topic and on the 
previous technical reports developed by the European Parliament, i.e. the “E-public, e-
participation and e-voting in Europe - prospects and challenges” final report, and “The Reform 
of the Electoral Law of the European Union”. Furthermore, it includes empirical evidence from 
the most recent trials of Internet voting and e-enabled elections and evaluates its 
implementation while bearing in mind the specificity of European Parliament elections. 
 
The implementation of Internet voting carries the promise of elections with more participants, 
of strengthened efficiency in the electoral process, and the hope of bringing voters and their 
representatives closer together. In the current context of decrease in participation in many 
Western democracies and generalised disappointment toward politics, policy-makers have 
been searching for innovative strategies to reengage citizens and promote a participated 
democratic process. Internet voting is a particularly attractive innovation in this regard, in 
the sense that is combines technology to the core of democratic participation. Therefore, it 
is commonly perceived as a panacea for many of the problems affecting contemporary 
democracies and great expectations arise concerning its potential impacts on the electoral 
process. 
 
However, both successful and unsuccessful cases of attempts to develop e-enabled elections 
are revealing of the complexity associated to a fully operational Internet voting procedure. 
On the one hand, Internet voting offers many potential advantages such as facilitating the 
voting process, increased convenience to voters, gains in efficiency and the promise of 
increase in turnout rates in the long run. Thus, Internet voting consists in an important 
opportunity to modernise European elections. On the other hand, it also comes with multiple 
challenges which, if not properly addressed, can undermine the integrity of elections.  
Legal challenges are related to the fact that Internet voting must be conceptualised within 
the broader framework of the European Electoral Law, as well as national legislation. 
Obtaining a uniform solution across Member States is most challenging, hence the optimal 
solution seems to consist in a decentralised approach where Member States operate within 
the restricting confines of an overarching European Law. In this regard, the Reform of the 
European Electoral Law is an important contribution to harmonise electoral procedures across 
all Member States. It is of utmost importance to future Internet voting in European Parliament 
elections. 
 
Politically, it is fundamental to foster a broad consensus among political elites for the 
implementation of Internet voting. This calls for a transparent, involved and participated 
process, where the relevant actors have a voice. Internet voting should also be relatively 
neutral from the political point of view, that is, the new procedure should not benefit 
disproportionally given factions of the political spectrum. The responsibility for bearing the 
costs with the design and implementation of the system is another important issue to 
consider, as well as the role of private actors in e-enabled elections. Finally, Internet voting 
at the European Parliament level could lead to a call for the dissemination of the new 
procedure at the national, regional and local level, both by citizens and national political 
actors. 
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Technological and security concerns are often pointed at as the main threats to Internet 
voting. Nonetheless, recent research demonstrates that the multiplication of pilots, trials and 
number of e-enabled elections has been contributing decisively for the development of more 
secure Internet voting systems. In addition, recommendations for a coordinated but 
decentralised i-voting system offer a good solution in terms of damage control in the event 
of attack or partial system malfunction. 
 
The most relevant social challenge is the digital divide. Although inequality has been a 
historical determinant of electoral participation long before computers and the Internet saw 
the light of day, it is a concern that parts of the population remain excluded from these 
technologies and that a gap persists between European countries regarding computer literacy 
and household Internet usage and availability. However, recently European countries have 
been progressing significantly in this regard, inverting these trends and diffusing the use of 
Internet-based technologies. It is to be expected that, in the medium run, the digital divide 
– at least in terms of access, but even in a longer perspective with regards to literacy - 
progressively fades away and becomes negligible. 
 
The success of Internet voting depends largely on how it is perceived by the people meant 
to use it: citizens. Therefore, it is fundamental to know what their attitudes towards the 
implementation of Internet voting are. Listening to citizens’ opinions and identifying their 
main concerns provides policy-makers with the opportunity to design the system in a way as 
to address these concerns and thus be both responsible and responsive. Unfortunately, there 
is a shortage of data on citizens’ attitudes towards Internet voting at the European level. 
There are a few studies addressing this topic with isolated approaches focused on specific 
trials conducted in very particular contexts. Hence, this report strongly recommends to 
develop a cross-country study to adequately measure this important dimension. Note that 
the few surveys carried out so far indicate a clear majority of public opinion supporting 
Internet voting. Generally, rather high levels of trust in proposed procedures could be 
measured. 
 
Internet voting is now beyond the trial stage. It has been gradually spreading throughout 
European countries – and also to non-European contexts – with successful outcomes. This is 
an opportunity to modernise European elections and facilitate citizens’ interaction with politics 
through elections. However, should Internet voting be made available to European citizens, 
it should be proposed as an alternative to on-paper ballot voting. The experience from 
successful cases highlights the benefits of developing a gradual, step-by-step designing and 
implementation of Internet voting systems. In this regard, trials are important instruments 
to measure citizens’ reactions to the procedure and to identify possible limitations of the 
system. It is also highly recommended to opt for a decentralised Internet voting structure 
which involves all the Member States in the process, with a coordinating role for the European 
institutions. Apart from the previously mentioned need for more in-depth cross-country 
studies on citizens’ perceptions of Internet voting, it is essential to develop effective voter 
education campaigns in order to familiarise voters with the new procedure and its 
particularities. Finally, it is recommended to follow a principle-based approach to legal 
regulation of Internet voting, with a focus on comparative lenses and building on existing 
cases of updated voting legislation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITIONS 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Remote Internet voting has become an increasingly popular alternative to on-paper 
voting. Trials have multiplied in several countries, as well as the number of 
successfully fully implemented e-enabled elections. 
 Today, Internet voting is experiencing a “second spring”. 
For the past two decades, the dynamic development of Internet technologies led to the 
implementation and expansion of Internet voting programs worldwide. The introduction of a 
novel element into the electoral process has predictably generated wide debates about 
benefits and risks of Internet voting in the short- and the long-run. However, over the course 
of the discussion, the supply and demand side of the Internet voting equation1 is usually 
perceived from a top-down perspective, often set apart from the interests and wishes of the 
voters themselves. After an initial “hype” at the end of the 1990s and in the early 2000s, 
some kind of disenchantment with internet voting set in. It became clear that despite some 
very promising pilots, Internet voting could not simply replace traditional forms of casting 
ballots and not even simply add to the latter, due to technical, legal and political problems. 
However, today, Internet voting experiences some kind of “second spring”, as demonstrate 
not only the examples of Estonia and Switzerland, but also the example of Canada where 
approximately one quarter of the provincial electorate in 97 municipalities could vote online 
during the recent Ontario 2014 municipal election, and some 30 of Nova Scotia's 54 
municipalities are anticipated to use online voting in 20162. Numerous other constituencies 
and States, including France, India and Australia offer Internet voting to parts of their 
electorate – usually citizens residing abroad – for a number of specific elections. 
 
Increasing political participation, reducing the cost of voting and convenience of the process, 
which makes Internet voting sticky, withstand to security and technological-related 
challenges. The latter, despite of their ubiquitous nature in the online word, can be minimized 
through improving the digital competencies of EU citizens and addressing security issues 
based on the experiences of such advanced digital European democracies as Estonia and 
Switzerland. 
 
Internet voting in the coming European Parliament elections, along with the traditional paper 
voting, would allow to measure and compare the popularity and trustworthiness of this new 
form of voting. Furthermore, it might lead to a possible increase in voter turnout and the 
share of citizens ready to take up an active part in e-democracy activities on the pan-
European level. 
 
Regarding definitions, when we refer to Internet voting in this report, we rely on the approach 
chosen by the 2011 Final Report on "E-public, e-participation and e-voting in Europe -
Prospects and challenges", according to which this encompasses a procedure that "seeks to 
maximize the convenience and access for the voters by enabling them to cast their ballots 
from virtually any location that is Internet accessible".3 
 
                                                 
1 A.H. Trechsel & F. Mendez (Eds.), The European Union and e-voting: addressing the European Parliament’s internet 
voting challenge, Routledge, London/New York, 2005 
2 N. Goodman, ‘Internet voting in a local election in Canada’. In B. Grofman, A. H. Trechsel, & M. N. Franklin (Eds.), 
The Internet and Democracy in a Global Perspective, Springer, Berlin, 2014 
3 European Parliament, E-public, e-participation and e-voting in Europe - prospects and challenges, 2011, p.111 
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This report is structured as follows: the first section describes opportunities for European 
Parliament elections from the standpoints of convenience of Internet voting, its potential 
effects on turnout, the quality of opinion formation, the efficiency of democratic participation 
and transnational/external voting. It is followed by a section considering challenges and 
pitfalls of Internet voting. In particular, legal, political, technological and security as well as 
social challenges are considered here. The third section of this report focuses on the missing 
element in the previous 2011 report - the voters. It emphasizes required aspects of 
trustworthiness in Internet voting such as citizens’ digital competencies, their trust in the 
Internet in general and in transactions over the Internet in particular. It also discusses 
citizens’ attitudes toward Internet voting more generally. The final section of the report 
describes the recent Internet voting experiences in Europe since 2011. Finally, the report 
provides a number of conclusions and recommendations. 
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2. INTERNET VOTING: AN OPPORTUNITY FOR EUROPEAN 
ELECTIONS? 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 In a context of growing disaffection with politics, Internet voting may operate as an 
important instrument to reconnect citizens with European politics. 
 Internet voting has the potential to increase turnout: it makes voting less costly  and 
more convenient for individuals (less time consuming, avoid travelling long 
distances to the polling stations, minimises obstacles such as bad weather or long 
queues, facilitates voting for people with reduced mobility or living abroad). 
 Increase in turnout rates should not necessarily be expected in the short- but 
medium- to long-run. 
 Internet voting offers gains in efficiency vis-à-vis on-paper ballot voting. 
 
Over the past decades, representative democracy in Europe has been evidencing signs of 
crisis: decrease in political interest, drop in party membership, low levels of trust in political 
institutions and satisfaction with government, general negative feelings towards the political 
elite, political parties perceived as unaccountable and irresponsive to citizens, and 
consequently turnout rates have been consistently declining in most European democracies 
over the last decades456. Attitudes towards the European Union and its political institutions 
are no exception to this trend7. The rise of euroscepticism has undermined the trust in 
European institutions and has accentuated the democratic deficit. Turnout in elections for the 
European Parliament has been historically low and, as a consequence of this progressive 
disengagement from national and European democratic processes, recently has been further 
decreasing (42,5% in 2014). In the sense that, in representative democracy, political 
institutions are largely legitimised through voting processes, this reality today questions the 
role of the European Parliament in adequately representing European citizens8. 
 
Internet voting has since the beginning been seen as a potentially effective tool to facilitate 
citizens’ participation in elections and, consequently, restore the democratic linkage between 
citizens and political institutions. Specifically regarding younger cohorts, it is recurrently 
perceived as a facilitative instrument for the initiation with voting, and as a promoter of a 
broader engagement with politics. As e-government develops in European democracies and 
the range of functionalities available to interact with the State over the Internet rapidly and 
profoundly increases, so do citizens’ expectations for innovations which facilitate our current 
voting procedures. The number of countries assessing the usefulness of Internet voting in 
Europe has been rising over the past years. Also, the number of elections in which this form 
of participation has been formally adopted is on the rise. In the context of this report, one 
important question is, of course, to what extent Internet voting might offer an opportunity 
to increase turnout rates for European Parliament elections? 
                                                 
4 L. Bardi, S. Bartolini, & A. H. Trechsel (Eds.), The Role of Parties in Twenty-First Century Politics: Responsive and 
Responsible? Routledge, London, 2014 
5 R. Dalton, & M. Wattenberg (Eds.), Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002 
6 P. Schmitter, & A. H. Trechsel, The Future of Democracy in Europe: trends, analyses and reforms - a Green Paper 
for the European Council. Council of Europe, 2002 
7 O. Cramme, & S. B. Hobolt, Democratic Politics in a European Union Under Stress. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2015 
8 Z. Lefkofridi, & A. Katsanidou, ‘Multilevel representation in the European Parliament’, European Union Politics, 
15(1), 2015, 108–131 
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Internet voting, in general, is deemed to offer increased convenience compared to traditional 
ballot box voting. It substantially reduces the costs for casting a vote. For instance, with 
regard to time, evidence from Estonia shows that on-paper voting is 16-times more time 
consuming than Internet voting9. Not surprisingly, the cost of having to go to a polling station 
is related to the probability of casting the vote over the Internet: Estonians living at least 31 
minutes away from polling stations have a 50% probability of using Internet voting10. 
Internet voting eliminates obstacles associated with bad weather, long lines, or confusion 
over the location of polling places1112. Therefore, it has the potential to boost turnout among 
the entire population, for whom the voting process is made essentially more convenient. Its 
greatest potential comes out, however, for voters with limited accessibility to traditional 
polling stations: people with reduced mobility such as the elderly or disabled citizens, citizens 
who work on Election Day, travellers or voters from abroad, as well as voters living further 
away from polling places. Postal voting can be seen as an alternative for some of these 
voters, of course, but Internet voting is often seen as not being less efficient in terms of 
costs, logistics (printing, mailing, counting), security and fraud (vote-selling, family voting). 
Also, while it has become rather simple for Europeans living abroad to inform themselves 
about their local politics and electoral campaigns, thanks to the Internet, the act of taking 
part in elections is most of the time rather cumbersome and time consuming. Not 
surprisingly, turnout rates among citizens living abroad tend to be lower than average, which 
has also (but of course not exclusively) to do with their difficulties for casting a valid vote 
from abroad. Specifically in the European context of increased mobility of citizens among 
Member States, where around 8 million economically active EU citizens live in an EU country 
other than their own, facilitating transnational/external voting is an important aspect to 
consider. Among these voters, having a simple access to the ballot box over the Internet can 
be, as studies have shown, particularly turnout-boosting13. 
 
Internet voting also carries the potential to reduce information costs by making relevant 
information available to voters on the Internet voting platform. For instance, information on 
candidates, parties and their platforms, or issues at stake in a referendum can be an effective 
mechanism for informing voters without much additional costs. In this sense, Internet voting 
can also contribute to the promotion of a better quality of opinion formation. 
 
The rational choice literature on individual-level turnout particularly emphasises the role of 
citizens’ costs to cast a vote as an obstacle to electoral participation. The lower the costs – 
not only financial but also opportunity costs such as the necessary time, the investment in 
obtaining relevant information about the parties/candidates, the aggravation of having to get 
to the polling station, etc. –, the fewer disincentives citizens have to participate in elections. 
From this perspective, Internet voting can offer a substantial contribution to foster turnout 
by substantially lowering the personal investment citizens have to put into acquiring 
information and going to the polls. 
 
Nevertheless, the problem of low turnout rates both in European and national parliamentary 
elections is less likely to be a result of the high costs of voting than of a general dissatisfaction 
with politics. Numerous studies have documented the relationship between satisfaction with 
democracy, perceived political efficacy of the vote on policy outcomes, interest in politics, 
                                                 
9 K. Vassil, Selected Behavioral Evidence on Estonian Internet Voting. University of Tartu, Tartu, 2015 
10 idem 
11 R. M. Alvarez, & T. E. Hall, Point, Click, and Vote: The Future of Internet Voting, Brookings Institution Press, 
Washington, D.C., 2003 
12 R. M. Alvarez, T. E. Hall, & A. H. Trechsel, ‘Internet Voting in Comparative Perspective: The Case of Estonia’. PS: 
Political Science & Politics, 42(3), 2009, 497–505. 
13 For Switzerland, see A. H. Trechsel,  & U. Gasser, ‘Casting Votes on the Internet: Switzerland and the Future of 
Elections’, Harvard International Review, 34(4), 2003 
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trust in political institutions and turnout. In sum, although reducing the costs of voting would 
surely increase, or at least stabilize, turnout rates, the core explanation of low turnout rates 
most likely lies in attitudinal factors which reflect a general distancing from politics. 
Technological innovations should not be conceived as a miraculous solution: Internet voting 
will not “provide a digital panacea to what is, in essence, a structural problem”14. 
Nevertheless, while Internet voting might not cure democracy’s ills on its own, it might at 
least help in the fight against voter apathy. 
 
From the administrative point of view, Internet voting offers gains in efficiency vis-à-vis paper 
ballots. The counting and recording of votes tends to be faster and more accurate because 
of reduced human intervention. For some proponents of Internet voting, the latter could 
therefore also be beneficial to fraud prevention in polling stations. Besides, it might be a 
more cost-efficient technology in the long-run, since it may help reducing traditional costs 
(personnel, voting material etc.). 
 
An eventual increase in turnout rates is also contingent on whether Internet voting is 
introduced as a replacement of on-paper voting or as a complementary mean. If the latter 
option is pursued, a mere addition to the range of voting procedures would hardly have 
negative consequences on turnout rates, although a differentiated effect across the 
population could affect democratic representation (see section 4.4.). A reflection on the 
positive impacts of Internet voting in increasing turnout rates in European Parliament 
elections also has to consider the heterogeneity of contexts existent in the European Union. 
This comes, primarily, with the recognition that turnout rates in the EU for the 2014 election 
have ranged from 13,1% in Slovakia to 89,6% in Belgium (Figure 1). 
 
 
 
On the one hand, EU countries have different institutional settings when it comes to election 
procedures: voting registration, voting age, compulsory voting, days of the week in which 
the elections take place, number and territorial distribution of polling stations, availability of 
other means of voting (e.g. mail voting). On the other hand, factors of legal, political and 
social nature such as the countries’ Electoral Law and Constitution, level of European 
                                                 
14 A. H. Trechsel, & F. Mendez, (Eds.), op. Cit., p.8 
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integration of the country, citizens’ attitudes towards the EU, or the country’s age of 
democracy may impact the perceived relevance of European Parliament elections. These 
combined factors may mediate – facilitating or posing obstacles – an eventual impact of 
Internet voting on turnout. Also, evidence from Estonia has shown that Internet voting is a 
habit-forming process whose impacts on turnout are incremental but diachronic, that is, the 
introduction of Internet voting has not caused an abrupt change in turnout rates but the 
effect is to be noted in the long-run. The magnitude and time necessary for it to produce the 
expected results may vary across countries. In sum, a homogenous increase in turnout rates 
should not be expected because the growth margin and the conditions of each country are 
distinct. A further consideration of these aspects will follow in the next section. 
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3. INTERNET VOTING: CHALLENGES AND PITFALLS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Although most likely Internet voting would have to be implemented in a decentralised 
fashion, it would be desirable to develop efforts towards a strengthened European 
Electoral Law. 
 The Reform of the Electoral Law minimizes discrepancies between Member 
States regarding the electoral procedures and meets an important requirement for 
Internet voting at the European level. 
 From the political point of view, a transparent and participated process, involving 
the relevant political actors and stakeholders would foster a broader political 
consensus around the procedure. 
 The political neutrality of the process, the responsibility for the investment in the 
infrastructure, and the role of private actors in e-enabled elections are important 
political challenges. 
 The introduction of Internet voting for European Parliament elections may lead to a 
growth in e-enabled elections at the national level. 
 Technological and security risks are both human and tech-related. 
 Security of Internet voting can be increased through the design of a coordinated but 
decentralised i-voting system. 
 The digital divide is the most relevant social challenge. However, it is estimated not 
to have a decisive impact on the voting process and its importance is expected to 
decrease substantially in the medium-run. 
3.1. Legal considerations 
 
From a legal perspective, two interrelated, but analytically distinct challenges need to be 
addressed when considering the introduction of Internet voting in elections for the European 
Parliament. First, any Internet voting scheme has to designed and evaluated in the light of 
the core principles of European electoral heritage as embedded in the current legal 
frameworks of voting in the European Union and in the Member States. From such a principle-
based perspective, the legal analysis should focus on Internet voting’s impact on the 
constitutional principles of electoral law: universal, equal, free, secret and direct suffrage. 
Secondly, it should consider the implications of Internet voting for EP elections according to 
EU legislation, as well as national legislation. This includes potential transformations of 
existing legal frameworks in order to embrace and regulate the new voting procedure. For 
instance, in the Swiss case, “the update of the legal infrastructure (…), required significant 
amendments to federal and cantonal laws”15. Taken together, the analytical and normative 
challenge is to synchronize legal analyses related to the adherence of Internet voting to 
existing laws while simultaneously considering adjustments of the legal system to enable and 
govern Internet voting.  
 
                                                 
15 A. H. Trechsel,  & U. Gasser, ‘Casting Votes on the Internet: Switzerland and the Future of Elections’, Harvard 
International Review, 34(4), 2003 
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Focusing on the first aspect of the challenge—adherence to fundamental principles as 
enshrined in law—Garrone16 has conducted an analysis of the consequences of Internet 
voting for fundamental and political rights, concluding that Internet voting does not pose any 
threats to the principles of direct suffrage. The principle of universal suffrage according to 
which everyone is entitled to the right to vote could only be harmed by the introduction of 
Internet voting as the only modality of voting, since people without access to the Internet 
could be impeded to vote. The one voter, one vote notion subjacent to equal suffrage cannot 
be assured as surely as with the traditional means of voting which require identification of 
voters “on the spot” but this caveat is also common to mail voting. Free suffrage is not 
significantly threatened by Internet voting, except for family voting, another limitation 
common to mail voting. Finally, ensuring secret voting is highly contingent on the design and 
quality of the system – the operations of checking who voted and counting the vote should 
be independent and the platform should aim for maximum standards of privacy and security. 
These principles have also been analysed according to the same framework in the 2011 Final 
Report on "E-public, e-participation and e-voting in Europe - Prospects and challenges"17. 
 
With regard to the second dimension of the challenge—adjustment of existing legal norms—
it is broadly recognized that the implementation of Internet voting “would need to be strictly 
defined, organised and put into operation, by law”18. In other words, establishing a legal 
basis for the introduction of Internet voting is an important challenge to be addressed when 
considering extending this new voting procedure to all Member States. This comes with the 
fundamental question of at what level should the legal basis be developed and implemented: 
at the European level, Member States, or a combination of the two. Auer and Mendez19 note 
that the “Article 190(4) ECT [Article 223(1) TFEU], since its amendment by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (TOA), provides that ‘[t]he European Parliament shall draw up a proposal for 
elections by direct universal suffrage in accordance with a uniform procedure in all Member 
States or in accordance with principles common to all Member States’”. However the design 
of a uniform electoral procedure has encountered many obstacles, “the EP being unable to 
make any headway under this option despite repeated attempts”20, and the anticipate that 
the “Council’s (read Member States’) intransigence that had been the main stumbling block 
to a uniform electoral procedure in the first place, is unlikely to mysteriously vanish as a 
result of the conviction of the wonders to be offered by e-voting”21. 
 
Therefore, the authors conclude that “the search for complete uniformity is largely a chimera” 
and “e-voting would have to be administered in a decentralised fashion”, where “Member 
States agents would be expected to operate within the restricting confines of an overarching 
European law, but fleshing out the details would be supplementary state rules and practices 
with all the scope for differentiation that this entails”22. This is not conflicting with the current 
state of affairs, namely “Article 7(2) of the 1976 Act concerning the election of the 
representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage (1976 EP Act), 
provides that ‘[p]ending the entry into force of a uniform electoral procedure … the electoral 
                                                 
16 P. Garrone, P., ‘Fundamental and political rights in electronic elections’. In A. H. Trechsel & F. Mendez (Eds.), The 
European Union and e-voting: addressing the European Parliament’s Internet voting challenge, Routledge, New 
York, NY, 2005 
17 European Parliament, op. cit. 
18 A. Auer, & M. Mendez, ‘Introducing e-voting for the European Parliament elections: the constitutional problems’. 
In A. H. Trechsel & F. Mendez (Eds.), The European Union and e-voting: addressing the European Parliament’s 
Internet voting challenge, Routledge, New York, NY, 2005, p.125 
19 idem, p.126 
20 For example, the recent European Parliament resolution of 11 November 2015 on the Reform of the Electoral Law 
of the European Union: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P8-TA-2015-
0395+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
21 idem, p.127 
22 idem, p.128 
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procedure shall be governed in each Member State by its national provisions’”23. Nonetheless, 
it would be desirable to develop efforts as to have the Member States under the same 
Electoral law given that the outcome of the election is common to all of them. 
 
Most importantly, the implementation of the Reform of the Electoral Law of the European 
Union, following the in-depth analysis recently conducted by the European Parliament report 
on “The Reform of the Electoral Law of the European Union – European Added Value 
Assessment accompanying the legislative own-initiative Report”, consists in an important 
step towards a common legal framework for EP elections. The report, which “calls for 
amendment of the Act concerning the election of Members of the European Parliament by 
direct universal suffrage and submits the Council a proposal to this effect”24 recognises the 
added value of Internet voting. The Reform of the Electoral Law minimizes discrepancies 
between Member States regarding the electoral procedures and meets an important 
requirement for Internet voting at the European level. 
 
At the Member State level, the substantive changes necessary to enable and regulate 
Internet voting depend on the particular characteristics of the existing legal framework aimed 
at regulating voting. That said, the Swiss example might be illustrative for the types of 
considerations and possible adjustments that are required: According to the analysis of 
Gasser and Gerlach25, several adjustments at both the Federal and cantonal level were 
necessary to address issues related to participation, autonomy, and quality of voting, with a 
particular emphasis on adjustments of procedural norms to ensure free and secret suffrage. 
Across these changes, Switzerland has largely followed a principle-based and technology-
neutral approach to enable cantonal variations in terms of exact (technical and 
organizational) implementation of the respective legal requirements. Gasser and Gerlach’s 
analysis also reveals that at least some of the policy issues and concerns related to Internet 
voting (for instance the question of participation, which is linked to digital literacy) cannot be 
resolved by changing voting laws, but require broader strategies concerning the general legal 
and policy framework. 
 
3.2. Political considerations 
 
The process of implementation of Internet voting involves political consequences which 
should be considered in the decision-making process. Concerns regarding the political 
implications of the process should be tackled at an early stage. A general political will common 
to the relevant EU political actors is a primary requisite. Previous trials and positive cases of 
Internet voting demonstrate that trust in the process is a fundamental factor for its 
subsequent success. The entire procedure should be transparent, participatory, and involve 
all the relevant political actors and stakeholders in order to foster a broad political consensus 
around the introduction of the procedure. This increases trust in the process and mobilises 
the support of the actors implicated for an easy operation. Citizens’ attitudes towards the 
Internet voting procedure, motivation to participate through Internet voting and confidence 
building may benefit largely from the way in which the process is perceived to be politically 
consensual and technically supported. The support of political elites has been highlighted as 
a key aspect to an effective transition to Internet voting. Political consensus may be 
                                                 
23 ibidem 
24 M. Nogaj, & E. Poptcheva, ‘The Reform of the Electoral Law of the European Union’, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, 2015 p.10 
25 U. Gasser & J. Gerlach, ‘Electronic Voting: Approaches, Strategies, and Policy Issues - A Report from Switzerland’. 
In S. van der Hof & M. Groothuis (Eds.) Innovating Government: normative, policy and technological dimensions of 
modern government, Asser Press, The Hague, 2011 
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weakened by security and technical concerns, national disputes between political parties 
related to the benefits of Internet voting, opposition to the incumbent parties, and/or distrust 
in the independence of those implementing the system26. 
 
Another important threat to political consensus may derive from reservations regarding the 
political neutrality of Internet voting. The political neutrality of the process of Internet voting 
is guaranteed if citizens’ political orientations do not have an impact on the probability to use 
Internet voting. If, for example, supporters of right-wing parties are found to use Internet 
voting substantially more than left-wing partisans, and, of course, if they had not participated 
in the absence of Internet voting, it can be concluded that the process is not politically neutral 
because it largely benefits a given political faction. The empirical evidence gathered so far is 
not uniform. While early analyses in Switzerland and in Estonia have concluded that the 
introduction of Internet voting was politically neutral272829, more recent analyses show that 
some parties in Estonia may have benefited from the introduction of Internet voting in the 
long run. However, as Solvak & Vassil30 show, the mechanism behind uneven vote shares of 
parties due to the availability of Internet voting does not primarily stem from the voting 
technology per se, but is rather determined by political preferences that are independent 
from the mode of accessing the ballot. In other words, while prima facie the Internet voting 
experience in Estonia might lead observers to believe there is political bias, the latter, though 
apparent, remains rather spurious when considering political preferences that precede voters’ 
decision to participate in an election. 
 
An option for Internet voting in elections for the European Parliament needs to consider as 
well its repercussions at the national level. In a scenario where voters can effectively vote 
for European Parliament elections through the Internet, with a satisfactory system 
performance and increased popular support for the procedure, the pressure for national 
governments to adopt Internet voting in the Member States may rise. This may be desirable 
if there is political will to proceed with the dissemination of Internet voting at the national 
level both by the EU and the Member States. In a context where voting online has been 
successfully implemented in EU elections, maintaining the traditional form of voting unaltered 
may be perceived by voters as an unnecessary obstacle to advances in democratic 
participation. Ultimately, it may affect Member States’ support for Internet voting in 
European Parliament elections level or result in a further disengagement of citizens at the 
national level, possibly followed by a continued decline of turnout rates. Therefore, the 
process should be carried as to avoid a clinch between technologically sophisticated EU 
elections and “outdated” national elections. This could be achieved by providing incentives 
and assistance to the Member States which are favourable to the introduction of Internet 
voting at the national level. 
 
Although Internet voting might be more cost-efficient in the long-run, the initial investment 
associated with the development of the system, security procedures, trials, promotion, voter 
education campaigns, etc. is expected to be substantial. The 2011 Final Report on "E-public, 
e-participation and e-voting in Europe - Prospects and challenges", highlights the “high 
expenditures the local authorities had to bear in campaigns promoting the new voting 
                                                 
26 IDEA, Introducing Electronic Voting: Essential Considerations, 2011, p.19 
27 F. Breuer & A. H. Trechsel, E-Voting in the 2005 local elections in Estonia - report for the Council of Europe, E-
governance academy, Florence, 2011 
28 A. H. Trechsel, ‘E-voting and electoral participation’. In C. H. de Vreese (Ed.), The dynamics of referendum 
campaigns: an international perspective, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, NY, 2007, p.173-7 
29 A. H. Trechsel, Internet voting in the March 2007 Parliamentary Elections in Estonia, European University Institute, 
Florence, 2007, p.57-8 
30 M. Solvak & K. Vassil (2016). E-voting in Estonia. Technological diffusion and other developments over ten years 
(2005-2015), Johan Skytte Institute of Political Studies University of Tartu & Estonian National Electoral Committee, 
2016, p.142 ff. 
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methods”31 and the scaling component of the cost-effectiveness argument – the more voters 
are covered by Internet voting, the lower the costs per voter are. Thus, the financial 
responsibility for the implementation of Internet voting is, of course, a sensitive aspect to 
consider. Eventual concerns regarding the required initial investment should be countered by 
the possibility to reduce costs in the long-term and gains in democratic participation and 
representation. Additional shared benefits, for example with the use of the infrastructure at 
the national level, are other possible incentives. 
 
Finally, and since the early trials with Internet voting, the debate about whether or not private 
actors should be involved in the development of voting technology has been flourishing. 
However, even if some voting systems, such as the Estonian one, are mainly developed and 
maintained by the state, most other Internet voting experiences have somehow been joint 
enterprises between the public authorities and private companies. Most aspects of modern 
Internet voting technology – the development of the online voting platform, cyber security, 
the implementation of end-to-end verification procedures, the transmission of votes, the 
counting of votes etc. –, rely ever more strongly on the help from private, specialised 
businesses. Given that elections in European democracies have been historically organised 
and controlled rather exclusively by the state, this is seen by some observers as an important 
change in respect to the traditional election process. Clearly, outsourcing certain key 
components of elections to private businesses may not be welcomed in all Member States 
who are used to have this key feature of democracy monopolised by the state and may be 
concerned about the consequences of involving private actors, with private interests, in such 
a fundamental feature of the democratic process. But note that traditional forms of voting 
are also strongly penetrated by public-private partnerships (1). Furthermore, it is common 
in most Western countries to have private companies – even if indirectly – administrating 
sensible electronic information, from personal data of citizens, to the motorization of aspects 
related to national security. As Pratchett et al.32 highlight, the concerns about the influence 
of private actors in elections and its potential “threats are not unique to the technology. 
Rather, they are a feature of the political and economic context in which elections might take 
place and it is certainly feasible that key workers or companies might seek to disrupt non-
electronic elections through other means.” 
 
3.3.  Technological and security challenges 
 
The technological and security challenges are usually viewed as serious threats to 
implementing Internet voting. In particular, the technologically-related risks can be described 
along two dimensions - (1) human-related and (2) tech-related. 
The human-related technological risks may include the following: 
• the lack of adequate technical skills as regards voters to use the remote Internet 
voting;  
• the lack of adequate technical skills as regards election officials, leading to the 
situation when they can lose control or scrutiny over key areas of the Internet 
voting process; 
• the citizens assurance that their votes remain secret;  
                                                 
31 European Parliament, op. cit., p.140 
32 L. Pratchett, M. Wingfield, B. Fairweather, & S. Rogerson, ‘Balancing Security and Simplicity in E-voting’. In A. H. 
Trechsel & F. Mendez (Eds.), The European Union and e-voting: addressing the European Parliament’s internet 
voting challenge, Routledge, London /New York: Routledge, 2005, p.172 
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• the lack of transparency when voters cannot be sure whether their votes are 
correctly counted and stored;  
• the danger of interference by someone else in proximity to a voter (for example, 
at home or at work) during the process of the remote Internet voting in order to 
control the voting decisions through intimidation, fraud, forcing to vote selling 
etc.;  
• the danger that voters who do not have or want any Internet access will feel 
themselves discriminated if remote Internet voting is the only option for voting.  
The tech-related technological risks may include the following: 
• the digital divide - the uneven possibilities of Internet access among different socio-
demographic groups; as a result, the danger that internet voters will not represent 
the general electorate, but only a part of it, skewing the results of the voting in 
favor of certain socio-demographic groups;  
• the possibility of system attack or breakdown, or connection failure;  
• the possibility that voter's personal computers are virus- or malware-infected 
which, in turn, can (1) result in distorting the vote decision or/and (2) affect the 
whole system of Internet voting;  
• the complexity with the correct identification of the voter;  
• the provision of the transparency of tabulation;  
• the provision of the preventive measures against multiple voting;  
• the complexity with a recount of votes by the demand of candidates in the case of 
very close election outcomes.  
 
There are substantial differences in Internet use across EU countries. Eurostat data from 
2013 reveals that whereas in Luxembourg 93% of the individuals were using the Internet “at 
least once a week” (92% in the Netherlands and in Sweden), only 45% used the Internet 
with the same frequency in Romania (51% in Bulgaria and 56% in Italy). 42% of the 
Romanian population never used the Internet (41% in Bulgaria), while in Denmark and 
Sweden that number is only 4%33. This picture reveals sizeable disparities among EU 
countries and any process towards the introduction of Internet voting should carefully 
consider that this procedure might only serve a selected part of the EU electorate, and, as a 
consequence, might have some implications for the democratic representation of citizens in 
Member States with major disadvantages in Internet connectivity. Nonetheless, the number 
of households with Internet access has been growing strongly in the past few years, with the 
strongest growth taking place in the countries that were at the bottom of the Internet-
connectivity rankings. In Bulgaria, for example, the number of households with Internet 
access has doubled in just five years (2009-2014), indicating that in a relatively short period 
of time the divide between EU countries could decline extensively (“Information society 
statistics - households and individuals,” 2015). 
The European Commission is working on improving the situation under the Europe 2020 
strategy, emphasizing fast and ultra-fast Internet access, as well as digital literacy skills and 
inclusion as priorities. Even if not all goals will be met by 2019, a joint availability of Internet 
voting and traditional means of casting a ballot in the next European Parliament Elections 
would hardly be problematic from an equality point of view. 
                                                 
33 H. Seybert & P. Reinecke, Internet use statistics – individuals, 2013. Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Internet_use_statistics_-_individuals 
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As other dimensions of e-government or e-democracy, Internet voting can be seen as a 
critical infrastructure of a democratic polity. In the sense that government formation tends 
to rely on election outcomes (with one notable exception being the European Union polity, 
despite the Spitzenkandidaten innovation), these infrastructures are potential targets of 
attacks both from within and outside territorial boundaries, with the objective of destabilising, 
sabotaging and/or manipulating the results. To a certain degree, the entire Internet 
infrastructure and its security is at stake and heavily dependent on the system’s (but also on 
the concerned polity’s) security capacities. Avoiding to go beyond our expertise of social 
scientists, we limit ourselves here to mention that among specialists in computer science and 
cryptography, the debate is alive regarding the ability to design systems fully protected from 
cyber-attacks – whether it concerns, for example, e-banking, digital systems managing 
heavy weaponry or e-enabled elections. 
In the recent past, a number of Internet voting exercises were the targets of cyber-
attacks/hacking. For instance, in 2010, there was an attack on the Washington D.C. Internet 
voting pilot project – originally intended to allow overseas absentee voters to cast their ballots 
over the web –, where hackers were able to change votes and reveal secret ballots without 
detection from officials34. In the 2013 Parisian mayoral primaries, reporters from “the news 
site Metronews proved that it was easy to breach the allegedly strict security of the election 
and vote several times using different names." (“Fake votes mar France’s first electronic 
election,” 2013). Researchers from the University of Michigan claim that they replicated in a 
laboratory environment the Estonian system using its published code, which was used for 
the 2013 elections. According to the authors of the study, the Estonian system was vulnerable 
against their attacks. In particular, the attacks included taking over voters' PCs to cast fake 
votes, and hacking into the vote-counting servers to install software that would alter the final 
count. The Estonian National Electoral Committee responded that it was taking any evidence 
of flaws in the electoral process seriously, but in the past decade its online balloting had 
stood up to numerous reviews and security tests. The committee concluded that "it is not 
feasible to effectively conduct the described attacks to alter the results of the voting". The 
Estonian National Electoral Committee emphasized that it "has numerous safeguards and 
failsafe mechanisms to detect attacks against the elections or manipulated results." In 
addition, the committee stated that "the researchers have not discovered any new attack 
vectors that had not already been accounted for in the design of our system as a whole." 
Moreover, the committee underlined that the researchers did not “provide technical details 
on the alleged vulnerabilities in our system"35. 
Despite the reports on attacks and other security issues in a number of Internet voting trials 
and implementations, most systems have evolved over time and greatly improved their 
security measures. The gradual implementation of the process, allowing for sufficient trials 
and proper development of a robust security system, together with a well-developed 
architecture of the procedure and an ongoing adaptation to new realities are fundamental 
factors for the resilience of any Internet voting system. 
In the current new security paradigm, where offline and online worlds are becoming more 
heavily intertwined, with terrorism no longer confined to the streets but intruding onto the 
data highways of modern society, it is the entire world of modern information and 
communication technology that is being challenged. Moreover, and often forgotten, criminals 
do not only break into electronic circuits, they may also physically attack the infrastructure. 
For instance, in the immediate aftermath of the Oslo bombing in 2011, technicians had a 
very hard time to get into the server rooms located in the government buildings in downtown 
Oslo in order to guarantee minimal server maintenance in the midst of the Norwegian 
Internet voting trials. However, it is important to underline the relative rarity of attacks (at 
least the successful and reported ones) to Internet voting platforms and the fact that most 
                                                 
34 S. Walchok, E. Wustrow, & J. Halderman (2012). ‘Attacking the Washington, D.C. Internet Voting System’. In A. 
Keromytis (Ed.), Financial Cryptography and Data Security, Springer, Berlin, 2012. 
35 C. Arthur, ‘Estonian e-voting shouldn’t be used in European elections, say security experts’, The Guardian, 2014, 
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of the reported attacks occurred during trial periods, when the systems were not yet fully 
developed. 
In this respect, security of Internet voting can be additionally increased through the design 
and implementation of a coordinated but decentralized i-voting system (or systems). A 
decentralized architecture may indeed lead to more flexibility and lower levels of vulnerability 
to external malicious threats and cyber-attacks. This recommendation has been repeated 
systematically in studies about security of e-enabled elections. Trechsel and Gasser36 mention 
the virtuous of a decentralized approach regarding the Swiss case. Decentralizing reduces 
the risk to have a full-scale attack which could jeopardize the entire electoral procedure. 
 
3.4. Social challenges 
 
Arguably, the most frequently mentioned caveat regarding Internet voting is linked to the 
digital divide, which essentially reflects inequalities in access to Internet and in technological 
literacy. It comes from the acknowledgement that there are social differences regarding who 
has a personal computer and internet at home (mainly income related), but also who is 
sufficiently technologically literate to be able to interact with an online voting platform 
(mainly age and educational differences). Mossberg, Tolbert and Stansbury37 propose a more 
comprehensive notion, as ‘‘an access divide, a skills divide, an economic opportunity divide, 
and a democratic divide’’. Gaps in these domains may inhibit specific groups of the population 
from participating and consequently exclude them from the democratic process. The degree 
“in which certain demographic groups gain an advantage over others (…) could easily affect 
descriptive representation in government and would likely affect substantive representation 
as well”38, challenging the value of equality subjacent to voting. 
Nevertheless, the historical character of inequality as a determinant of electoral participation 
should not be neglected. Although originally intended to promote equality in relation to the 
political system by the “one man, one vote” principle, in practical terms, that could only ever 
been partially achieved. The literature on electoral participation has systematically 
documented the historical role socio-demographic factors have played throughout the 
twentieth century as determinants of turnout. Younger (and very old) people have been found 
to vote less, men have been found to vote more than women, more educated people have 
tended to vote more, lower income citizens have structurally abstained more, as well as 
people from rural regions, to name a few examples. But also if we particularly consider the 
importance of technology, for example with respect to television and its importance for 
political communication, acquiring of political information, development of political interest, 
etc., a digital divide regarding access to this technology – deriving, too, from social 
inequalities– was initially profoundly marked. More than socially relevant, these social 
cleavages had political ramifications in the sense that the electoral base of parties was distinct 
(parties targeted specific social groups with their policy platforms), and democratic 
consequences, because these groups were historically underrepresented. Still, those social 
divides have faded away and are, nowadays, irrelevant in most Western democracies as 
determinants of turnout. Similarly, inequalities concerning the digital divide have been 
decreasing over the past decades, as more individuals have been gaining access to computers 
and broadband Internet connections have widespread through European households. 
Eurostat estimated in 2013 that 62% of the EU citizens were using the Internet, on average, 
“every day or almost every day” and 72% “at least once a week”, and two in five individuals 
had used e-government services39. Notwithstanding the persisting imbalances, it is 
expectable that over the course of the next decades – like with television – computers, 
                                                 
36 A. H. Trechsel & U. Gasser, op. cit 
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Internet access and the minimum technological literacy indispensable to use online voting 
have become almost fully diffuse over the population of European countries. 
Serdült et al.40 reviewed the current state of research in 22 empirical studies relating Internet 
voting with socio-economic variables to assess to what extent would its introduction further 
underrepresent some segments of the electorate. Although they have identified differences 
regarding age (second youngest age group are the most frequent users), education (higher 
educated use more) and income (high income individuals use more), these were strongly 
moderated by the general use and trust in the Internet. The authors have concluded that the 
impact of socio-demographic variables on the selection of Internet voting as mean of 
participation dies out with the use of more comprehensive models and “the real cause for the 
divide between i-voters and traditional voters is their affinity to the internet”. They also add 
that “with time, i-voters will get older and the age gap will disappear”. Therefore, since 
“socio-economic factors such as age, gender, income and education are only relevant to a 
certain degree when explaining the choice to vote online and are rather strongly moderated 
by knowledge and use of the internet”, there is margin for attenuating the divide with a 
progressive dissemination of Internet over each countries’ population. 
Following Trechsel’s et al.41  findings on the Estonian case, language is another crucial factor 
to consider particularly in multilingual countries. The authors have discovered that language 
barriers were causing a “systematic exclusion of the Russian-speaking minority from e-
voting”42 because the Internet voting platform was offered exclusively in Estonian language. 
Interestingly enough, this problem has been resolved with time, as following the Council of 
Europe’s repeated recommendations regarding potential exclusionary effect of the Estonian 
Internet voting system, if offered only in Estonian language, the government has gradually 
implemented a Russian version of the system. As a result, language is not anymore among 
the determinants of Internet voting. 
Finally, a social analysis might also want to consider the impact of Internet voting on the 
symbolic dimension of voting. First of all, this involves the notion of secrecy in an uncontrolled 
environment. Apart from the security issues commonly associated with Internet voting, 
phenomena like family voting, intimidation and vote-buying could occur when any form of 
remote voting – including Internet voting – is offered. 
A rather common discourse about Internet voting tends to perceive voters as consumers and 
establish analogies between Internet voting and a number of day-to-day tasks which can be 
done online (shopping, paying bills, etc.). Equating the act of voting to other banal activities 
may convey the pernicious consequence of disproving voting of its meaningful character. 
Although the formal function of elections might be assured by Internet voting systems, 
concerns have been raised about the subjective meaning of voting online. For some 
observers, the procedural routine of on-paper and above on-site voting helps citizens to 
become aware of their collective act of electing their representatives. Inasmuch as voting 
online is to be perceived as thoughtless and ordinary, it may be a peril to the democratic 
process, so this line of argumentation goes. Critics of Internet voting argue that the 
elimination of the physical act of going to the polls speeds up an otherwise reflective process, 
allowing for impulsive decisions43 and, in addition, turn it into “the antithesis of the 
community-based electoral process that many believe is desirable”44. Conversely, supporters 
of Internet voting claim this is an effective tool to re-enfranchise citizens who would otherwise 
be excluded from the election and in this sense it reinforces social cohesion and promotes a 
better democracy. Also, the effectiveness of queuing up in front of voting booths to create a 
feeling of collective belonging to democratic ideals is rather questionable. Still, the very act 
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of voting should not be diminished by the introduction of Internet voting – and to our 
knowledge there is no evidence so far showing that such a problem has occurred in major 
Internet voting implementation. 
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4. THE MISSING ELEMENT: VOTERS? 
 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Parts of the European electorate still has underdeveloped digital skills and trust in 
operations over the Internet. There are also clear differences across countries. 
However, digital competence and trust in operations over the Internet has been 
consistently increasing and the gap between the digitally literate and illiterate has 
been strongly narrowing. 
 The scarcity of data on public support for Internet voting in Europe calls for the need 
to develop thorough cross-country studies to measure citizens’ opinion about the 
introduction of e-enabled elections. 
 The existing surveys on citizens’ attitudes towards Internet voting indicate a strong 
majority of support for Internet voting. 
 
In the debates over the implementation of Internet voting, the voices of legislators, politicians 
and various computer experts usually prevail. At the same time, the voices of the voters are 
often relegated to the background or even not mentioned in the debates. However, a more 
complete investigation of the issue requires the 'supply and demand' model to be reversed 
and explored as the 'demand and supply' one. With that, the 'demand' should not be 
interpreted here in the narrow sense of the word as a 'wish' only, but, taken as a whole, the 
wish, the ability or competency to externalize the wish, and trust to the method of the wish 
externalization. Information on all the three components is provided below. In particular, 
citizens’ digital competencies in the EU, trust to operations over the Internet, and citizens 
attitudes toward Internet voting. 
 
4.1. Citizens digital competencies in the EU 
 
The report "Measuring Digital Skills across the EU: EU wide indicators of Digital Competence", 
issued in May 2014, presented the new methodology used for the measurement of digital 
skills in the Digital Agenda Scoreboard 201445 (European Commission, 2014). The work 
represents pilot work carried out by DG CONNECT F4 in relation to action 62 of the Digital 
Agenda to propose "EU-wide indicators of digital competence". “Digital competence involves 
the confident and critical use of information Society technology (IST) for work, leisure, 
learning and communication. It is underpinned by basic skills in ICT”46. Data used in the 
indicator take as their source the Eurostat Community Survey on ICT Use in Households and 
by Individuals. Over many years this survey has developed a broad set of questions and 
indicators relating to household and individual ICT access, use and skills and covers a 
representative sample of the EU population between the ages of 16 and 74. 
According to the report, results for all individuals show that 23% of the EU population barely 
had any digital skills (2012), with figures ranging from 6% in Sweden to 50% in Romania. 
Considering that to function effectively in the digital society one needs at least medium level 
or "basic" skills, a sobering low level of skills was measured in the EU as a whole, with 47% 
of the population either being classified as having "low" or "no" digital skills. 
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Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=5406 
46 Please refer to Annex 1 for a thorough definition of Digital Competence and its Framework areas. 
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In 2012, the percentage of individuals in the EU who used the internet was 73%. As for 
November 30, 2015, the percentage increased to 79,3% (Internet World Stats). 
Unfortunately, new data on Digital Competencies / Digital Skill Indicators, based on the 2015 
study, is unavailable. It remains sound, however, to assume that digital skill levels have 
increased since the 2012 report, with generational replacement and the radically accelerated 
digital transformation of society taking place. Therefore, prospects for an ever more e-savvy 
electorate in Europe are rather good, in our view. The introduction of Internet voting at 
European level should not be seen as fundamentally challenged by the current state of affairs 
regarding Internet For understanding the technical complexities of a common Internet voting 
system, such as the one offered to Swiss citizens from certain cantons, a rather low level of 
digital skills is, today, arguably sufficient for casting one’s vote. 
 
4.2. Trust to operations over the Internet 
 
The results of a survey on the level of trust in the Internet in EU 28 countries in 2014 (27,901 
respondents) shows that 36% of respondents aged 15 and older trust the Internet in the EU. 
The highest level of trust was measured in Czech Republic (56 percent) and the lowest in 
Germany (27 percent)47. 
Also, trust in the Internet can be viewed as trust in the operations over the Internet - such 
as making purchases online or using online banking. In this regard, according to the Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI) - a composite index that summarises relevant indicators 
on Europe’s digital performance and tracks the evolution of EU Member States in digital 
competitiveness – shows that the “use of the Internet” score is on a uphill slope, in the EU 
as a whole as well as in the individual Member states. EU citizens clearly become ever more 
engaged in online activities. When it comes to online transactions, EU Internet users are keen 
on doing their banking activities online (57%) and close to two-thirds of all Internet users 
reported to have shopped online during 2014, that is, trust the Internet enough to engage in 
online shopping. These results are of relevance and are clearly promising – in view of the 
potential introduction of Internet voting at European level. 
 
4.3. Citizens attitudes toward Internet voting 
 
So far, we lack recent cross-sectional data on attitudes of citizens towards Internet voting in 
the EU28. An earlier, pre-enlargement Eurobarometer survey (54.2 in 2001) had a question 
on this topic, though. Still, several useful research endeavours were carried out in a number 
of European countries. 
Greece 
Delis et al.48 have conducted an Internet voting trial in two polling stations in Greece after 
respondents having cast a vote for the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections. That trial was 
followed by a survey about attitudes towards Internet voting. Although this raises some 
problems regarding self-selection of the (non- representative) sample (N = 648), since it 
only draws the sample from people who actually went to vote, this is minored by the fact 
that voting is compulsory in Greece. The sample was particularly skewed regarding age and 
                                                 
47 Statista, Trust in the internet in Europe 2014, by country, 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/422787/europe-trust-in-the-internet-by-country/ 
48 A. Delis, et al., Pressing the button for European elections: Verifiable e-voting and public attitudes toward internet 
voting in Greece, 2014. Retrieved from http://www.e-voting.cc/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2014/10/evote2014_delis_gavatha_kiayias_ p129-135.pdf 
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education: individuals were, on average, older and better educated than the Greek 
population. 
The survey’s results demonstrate that 90% of respondents were “somewhat” or “very 
satisfied” with the electronic voting experience. 47% of the respondents trusted an e-voting 
device such as the one used, whereas only 2% had a negative opinion towards a possible 
implementation. 75% of the respondents were “somewhat” or “very positive” towards the 
prospect of being able to vote in national elections from home with the use of a similar device, 
while 12% appeared dismissive. 
Older individuals and those who do not use the Internet found the device harder to use. 
Better educated voters, however, found it easier to use. Ease of use was associated with 
trust in the instrument and the general positive attitude towards the implementation of an 
Internet voting system. Older cohorts appeared more trustful, which may be related to a 
lower awareness of possible security threats. Education was not found to be associated with 
trust. 
Sweden 
Faraon et al.49 have conducted an online survey after the 2010 national elections with a non-
representative sample of the Swedish population (N=5683) drawn from social media 
platforms. Their results for the Swedish context reveal overall positive attitudes towards 
Internet voting, although respondents remain cautious concerning security issues (actual 
percentages of how the respondents answered are not provided). 
Regarding the participation factor (that is, 1. Believing in a positive effect on participation; 
2.Believing in social and emotional presence created by social media; 3.Believing in a positive 
effect on own likelihood to participate; 4.Presenting candidates on webpages will have a 
stimulating effect; 5 Increasing participation for younger citizens; 6.Increasing overall 
participation), women have more positive attitudes than men. No differences of age were 
encountered. 
Regarding the security factor (that is, 1. Willing to participate in an I-election if security can 
be guaranteed; 2.Not worrying about security issues in terms of poll manipulation; 3. Rating 
danger of intrusion as small; 4.Diminishing errors in counting votes by I-election; 5. Down 
rates threat to democracy because of uneven access to Internet; 6. Not finding traditional 
voter safer than I-voting; 7. Believing in satisfactory solution of security issues; 8. Believing 
in effect on the experience of voting; 9. Not believing that reliability of I-election would be in 
jeopardy), men were significantly more optimistic than women. Participants’ confidence in 
security increased with age and length of formal education had a powerful positive effect on 
security attitudes. 
Sweden is a case where the potential effects of a digital divide may be mitigated given the 
high prevalence of Internet access in that country: 95% of citizens between 16-74 years old 
have access to the Internet from their homes. 
Austria 
68% of the respondents reported a strong trust in the Internet voting system with respect 
to its integrity and secrecy of vote; 12% were strongly concerned50. 
The survey which followed the voting test among Austrians living abroad in 2006 
demonstrated a wide positive feedback as to the usability during the registration and voting 
phase. In particular, 85% of the respondents evaluated the registration as simply practicable, 
83% also advanced this view concerning the voting. 68% of the respondents showed 
                                                 
49 M. Faraon, G. Stenberg, J. Budurushi & M. Kaipainen, Positive but Skeptical: A Study of Attitudes Towards Internet 
Voting in Sweden, Presented at the Conference for e-democracy and open government, 2015. 
50 A. Prosser, K. Schiessl & M. Fleischhacker, ‘E-Voting: Usability and acceptance of two-stage voting procedures’. 
In M. Wimmer, J. Scholl, & A. Grönlund (Eds.), Electronic Government, Springer, Heidelberg, 2007 
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confidence or big confidence in the system and its ability to correctly conduct the election 
and to protect voter anonymity51. 
Norway 
Trust in Internet voting was very high (76% in 2011; 81% in 2013) during both trial 
elections52. Women, married couples, and those with higher income and education were more 
favourable. Older age groups preferred the traditional voting process, whereas the younger 
generations preferred Internet voting. Also for Norway, a majority of the respondents found 
it acceptable that others could see how they voted, provided that no criminal activity 
occurred. They were also open to people helping others cast their vote whenever that person 
couldn’t do it him- or herself (disabilities, etc.). 
Despite the momentary failure of introducing Internet voting in Norway beyond the pilots, 
mainly due to political disagreements, the trials have proven to be a success in ensuring the 
trust to the new voting channel. In particular, the eVote project has received more than 94% 
of trust evaluations by voters. 
Switzerland 
A survey as of the 2011 Swiss National Election Study “SELECTS” found that 61% of the 
1’549 participants strongly supported Internet voting. Similarly high levels (and even higher 
levels) of trust could be found in several research endeavours at the cantonal level. 
 
UK 
YouGov Plc. surveyed online 1’566 adults in the UK in March 2015. The questions asked were 
related to respondents’ attitudes toward a possibility of smartphone/tablet voting in a general 
election. The figures have been weighted and are representative of the UK adult population 
(aged 18+). 63% of all respondents believe the introduction of smartphone and tablet voting 
would increase turnout. 35% voters oppose introducing smartphone/tablet voting, while 41% 
support it and 18% remain neutral. 51% claimed they would less trust the result of any 
election that included smartphone and tablet voting due to security and safety reasons. 
The biggest fear of 40% of respondents was that smartphone/tablet voting would lead to 
elections being rigged/fixed, with voters unable to watch the counting process. Voters aged 
60+ have the strongest opposition to the introduction of smartphone/tablet voting (46%), 
but 52% of this age group still believed it would lead to increased turnout. 
In addition, in April 2015, the polling company Opinium conducted a survey and found that, 
if online voting would be introduced in the future, it would be the most popular method of 
voting in the UK. Out of over 2000 UK adults aged 18+, 45% would choose to vote by Internet 
in the future. 
In turn, the Digital Democracy Commission set up by Commons Speaker John Bercow made 
recommendations to incorporate e-voting during the next election in 2020. 
 
The few countries where there have been surveys conducted on citizens’ attitudes towards 
the implementation of Internet voting indicate a majority of support for the new voting 
technology. Overall trust toward Internet voting in the European context is quite high and 
even increasing over time. Not surprisingly, the main concerns expressed are related to 
privacy and security issues. Therefore, efforts should concentrate on ensuring the system’s 
                                                 
51 A. Prosser & R. Steininger, An Electronic Voting Test Among Austrians Abroad; Nr. 02/2006, Institut für 
Informationsverbeitung und Informationswirtschaft - Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien, 2006 
52 S. Segaard, D. Christensen, B. Folkestad, & J. Saglie, Internettvalg: Hva gjør og mener velgerne?, 2014 Retrieved 
from http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/KMD/KOMM/rapporter/ ISF_Internettvalg.pdf 
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security and in effectively communicating about the latter to the wider public. There were 
also slight differences mainly across age categories regarding the support, which are probably 
a reflection of the digital divide. These differences are expected to eventually die out in a few 
decades. 
The scarcity of data on public support for Internet voting in Europe calls for the need to 
develop more cross-country studies to measure citizens’ opinion about the introduction of e-
enabled elections. Public support has been named as an important factor for the successful 
implementation of Internet voting as citizens are the main target of this policy and its positive 
consequences – for example regarding an increase in turnout – are highly contingent on how 
it is publicly perceived and welcomed. If Internet voting is largely seen as unnecessary, 
unsafe or easily manipulated, it is likely that people continue to vote using preferably 
traditional means. Therefore, more studies comprising more countries would be desirable to 
understand how European citizens assess the implementation of Internet voting. 
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5. RECENT INTERNET VOTING EXPERIENCES IN EUROPE: A 
SHORT ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Estonia is a successful case of implementation of Internet voting: the number of 
individuals voting over the Internet has been increasing consistently, voters who try 
Internet voting remain loyal to this option, and Internet voting is now entirely diffused 
over the electorate. 
 Switzerland has been carrying a gradual and decentralised bottom-up 
implementation of Internet voting coordinated at the national level. The results have 
been extremely encouraging and the plans are to further expand the system. 
 Norway conducted trials between 2011 and 2013 but cancelled the project in 2014 
due to security concerns expressed by political actors and absence of increase in 
turnout levels.  
5.1. Estonia 
 
Estonia is, arguably, the most prominent case of successful implementation of Internet 
voting. In the 2015 Estonian parliamentary elections, around 30,5% of participating voters 
chose to vote online instead of using the conventional53. Bearing in mind that in 2007, when 
the system was made available for the first time in general elections, these were about 5% 
of the participating voters, the increase in the popularity of Internet voting is noticeable.  
Moreover, after three e-enabled general elections, e-voters stopped to be distinguishable 
from conventional on-paper voters and Internet voting has diffused across the electorate. 
Since 2011, the chances of online voting are the same for the young and old, educated and 
less educated, PC-literate and less PC-literate. According to Vassil54, "at least three elections 
are required before internet voting starts to diffuse. Thus, new voting technology is inclusive 
rather than exclusive means of political participation and has the opportunity to bridge 
societal divisions". Another finding is that once one started voting online, he/she is highly 
likely to remain voting online in the future. Empirical evidence55 on the Estonian case has 
also confirmed that Internet voting significantly lowers the costs of participation and is 
particularly preferred for people living further away from polling stations. Finally, it was 
demonstrated that conventional on-paper voting takes about 16-times more than casting an 
online vote. 
Regarding the future of Internet voting, Solvak and Vassil56, refer to the vision of the “father 
of Internet voting in Estonia”, Tarvi Martens (Chairman of the Estonian Electronic Voting 
Committee) according to which one “|…] can safely say that internet voting is here to stay”. 
As these authors also mention, however, is that the system of Internet voting in place will 
evolve, as it always has. For the local elections of 2017, full end-to-end verifiability should 
be offered to the voters: “homomorphic cryptography, mix-nets and zero-knowledge 
protocols |…] will serve to make this possible”57. Also, Estonia works towards an outsourced 
solution for the vote collection part of the system. Finally, the new system should be 
universally usable and therefore offer great scalability beyond public elections and above all 
beyond Estonia. 
 
                                                 
53 M. Solvak, & K. Vassil, op. cit., p.4 
54 K. Vassil, Selected Behavioral Evidence on Estonian Internet Voting, University of Tartu, Tartu, 2015. Retrieved 
from http://www.ut.ee/kristjan.vassil/wp-content/uploads/E-voting-evidence.pdf, p.2 
55 M. Solvak, & K. Vassil, op. cit., p.109 
56 M. Solvak, & K. Vassil, op. cit., p.174 
57 Ibidem 
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5.2. Switzerland 
 
The first trial in Switzerland was introduced in 2003 in the commune of Anières, in the canton 
of Geneva. The object was a municipal referendum and 44% of the votes were cast online58. 
One year later, the canton of Geneva introduced Internet voting for cantonal and federal 
elections in selected municipalities. In 2005, the canton of Zurich initiated its first Internet 
voting trials. In the same year, the canton of Neuchatel implemented Internet voting for 
federal elections.  
In all of these cantons, the process was implemented quite gradually, either by starting in 
small selected municipalities (Geneva and Zurich), or by introducing a cap on the number of 
votes which could be cast online (Neuchatel) in order to contain the damages in case of 
system malfunction. After the success of the tests, the Swiss government focused on the 
Swiss citizens living abroad as the main target for Internet voting. In 2007, Neuchatel allowed 
Swiss citizens living abroad to vote over the Internet. The canton of Basel-Stadt did the same 
in 2009. In 2010, “the federal government approved for the first time the right of citizens of 
twelve cantons to vote via the Internet voting system of their respective canton in the context 
of a federal election59. In 2015, 14 cantons offered Internet-voting in either cantonal and/or 
federal elections. In total, more than 200 binding trials were conducted on the federal level, 
so far. Up to 65% of the voters chose the electronic channel over the conventional ones. 
Today’s systems are enhanced to second generation systems. Nonetheless, a cap of 10% on 
Internet voting for the federal electorate and 20% for the cantonal electorate still holds. 
Now online voting is open to 60% of the Swiss abroad (about 90,000 voters) and to 3% of 
the overall electorate. Authorities plan to continuously extend Internet voting to all out-of-
country voters and gradually expand it to all eligible voters. In 2015, individual verifiability 
was introduced ("cast-as-intended") that along with the universal verifiability ('recorded as 
cast' and 'counted as recorded') makes possible the complete verifiability of Internet voting. 
Starting in 2016, a slow expansion to more residents, in selected cantons, is being put in 
practice. In addition, The Federal Council and the Federal Chancellery approved e-voting 
trials, and the cantons will decide, in collaboration with federal authorities, if and when e-
voting should be introduced. 
Switzerland is a paradigmatic case of the benefits of an incremental, decentralized bottom-
up approach coordinated at the national level. So far there is not much evidence of an 
increase in turnout as a consequence of the introduction of Internet voting. However, it is 
still rather early to draw robust conclusions in that regard. In addition, noticeably, an 
enormously high proportion of Swiss voters (in certain urban areas up to 95%) cast their 
vote by postal mail, a modality which is not offered in many other European contexts and 
which naturally dampers the impact of Internet voting on turnout. 
 
5.3. Norway 
 
Norway conducted Internet voting trials in the 2011 local elections and 2013 parliamentary 
elections. Online votes could be cast during the advanced voting period, whereas on Election 
Day voting was restricted to conventional on-paper voting. The trials comprised 10 
municipalities in 2011 and 12 in 2013. End-to-end verifiability was implemented only in the 
2013 elections. 26,4% of those who participated in the 2011 local elections have done so 
through Internet voting, a figure that increased to 36,4% in the 2013 parliamentary 
elections. The vast majority of advance votes were cast over the Internet - indeed, more 
than 77% of the advance votes were online votes in the trial municipalities. “Nevertheless, 
                                                 
58 A. H. Trechsel & U. Gasser, op. cit 
59 Idem, p.55 
Potential and challenges of E-Voting in the European Union 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
29 
the fact that Internet voting was used by so many voters did not lead to an increase in the 
overall voter turnout.”60. 
The 2011 trial was monitored by International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) and 
was found to meet the “Council of Europe’s recommendations regarding secrecy both when 
the vote is cast and when the vote is subsequently stored. The sufficiency of these 
mechanisms has nevertheless been questioned in the Norwegian debate”61 and the 
authorities “cancelled the project in 2014, citing security concerns and the government’s 
conclusion that, contrary to expectations, the new system had not improved turnout. 
Specifically, Norway’s Institute of Social Research said that there was “no evidence that the 
trial led to a rise in the overall number of people voting nor that it mobilized new groups, 
such as young people, to vote. Even just a “low-effort” review of the system by computer 
experts from the Norwegian Computing Center and the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology found “significant problems” with security, among other things, to the extent that 
the experts said the software did “not have acceptable quality for use in an e-voting system”. 
The OSCE/ODIHR Election Assessment Mission Final Report mentions that “experts on 
electronic voting expressed satisfaction with the mechanisms to verify the integrity of election 
results and safeguard the secrecy of electronic votes”62. The report also recommends 
additional resources to “audit the security, integrity and secrecy of the system, and to 
perform complete end-to-end verification”63, that preparations for the Internet voting 
procedure are taken earlier in advance, that authorities promote further voter education and 
encourage third party verification of the process. 
Norway implemented a limited Internet voting system for municipal elections in 2011 and 
2013 but cancelled the project in 2014, citing security concerns and the government’s 
conclusion that, contrary to expectations, the new system had not improved turnout. 
Specifically, Norway’s Institute of Social Research said that there was “no evidence that the 
trial led to a rise in the overall number of people voting nor that it mobilized new groups, 
such as young people, to vote64. Even just a “low-effort” review of the system by computer 
experts from the Norwegian Computing Center and the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology found “significant problems” with security, among other things, to the extent that 
the experts said the software did “not have acceptable quality for use in an e-voting 
system”65. 
                                                 
60 J. Saglie & S. Segaard, ‘Internet voting and the secret ballot in Norway : principles and popular understanding’, 
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 26(2): 155-169, 2016, p.160 
61 Idem, p.161 
62 OSCE/ODIHR, Norway Parliamentary Elections – Election Assessment Mission, Final Report, 2013, p.7 
63 Idem, p.8 
64 D. Lee, E-voting experiments end in Norway amid security fears, 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28055678 
65 B. Østvold & E. Karlsen, ‘Public Review of E-voting Source Code: Lessons Learnt from E-vote 2011’. In Norsk 
informatikkonferanse NIK 2012, Universitetet i Nordland, 2012. Retrieved from https://www.verifiedvoting.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Norway-2012-Public-Review-of-E-voting-Source-Code-Lessons-Learnt-from-E-vote-
2011.pdf 
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6. CONCLUSIONS: ATTEMPTING TO ASSESS THE 
OPPORTUNITY OF INTRODUCING INTERNET VOTING 
FOR EUROPEAN ELECTIONS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Internet voting has been implemented successfully and has gone beyond the trial 
stage in multiple contexts. 
 E-voters are growing in numbers and remain loyal to Internet voting after 
having been exposed to it. 
 Internet voting for the European Parliament elections could build on the Estonian case. 
 Opportunity to modernise European Parliament elections and bring them closer 
to citizens. 
This report builds on recent publications and analyses on Internet voting, first and foremost 
from Europe. Overall we can conclude that we are witnessing a spreading of Internet voting, 
not so much in geographical terms but horizontally and vertically within the Internet voting 
pioneers, where ever more experience is gathered. We have also witnessed both success and 
failure, and the multitudes of different solutions, themselves constantly evolving and 
adapting over time show that it is difficult to extrapolate from one case to the other. One 
thing is quite clear, however: where Internet voting has been implemented successfully and 
beyond the trial stage, it has become an integral feature of the electoral process. Voters 
having had the chance to become regular e-voters usually remain e-voters. They would 
hardly appreciate having to go back to paper and pencil. This is not an outcome one can 
expect within one single trial, but the fruit of repeated efforts to offer Internet voting to an 
ever-growing number of voters. 
Today, the European Union is offered a great opportunity for fostering Internet voting 
technologies in view of modernising European elections. Estonia, one of the “new” EU 
member states, can clearly serve here as an example. It offered its voters twice already the 
chance to elect their European Parliamentarians online, in 2009 and 2014, respectively. And 
Estonia is willing to share its experience, it is working towards greater scalability and has 
published the code for its system. Of course, the European Union is not equally prepared as 
Estonia for introducing Internet voting “à l’éstonienne”. For once, it lacks a European digital 
identity card, a tool so central to the Estonian architecture of e-government services. But 
digital identity cards in the European Union are fostered, not the least by the eIDAS 
Regulation of 201466 that prepares the digital, continent-wide future of e-commerce. This 
well-established groundwork could possibly be used for making Estonian Internet voting 
scalable beyond this small Baltic state’s border. 
In a sense, and despite legal, security and political concerns that will probably always be 
there, independently from whether one has introduced Internet voting or not, the European 
Union now has the opportunity to take up these challenges in order to bring European 
Parliament Elections closer to the citizens. For sure, Internet voting won’t be the panacea for 
European democracy. But it has the potential to facilitate access to the polls and serve as an 
example for other constituencies concerned with the modernisation of electoral processes. 
                                                 
66 Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic 
identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC. 
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7. RECOMMENDATIONS 
KEY FINDINGS 
 Need for a coherent enquiry on European citizens’ attitudes toward Internet 
voting in order to assess the receptivity of such a new procedure among the general 
public and, most importantly, identify citizens’ main concerns in order to address 
those specific points when designing the system. 
 Advise for a step-by-step approach to the Internet voting process, with the holding 
of trials and a gradual implementation of the system. 
 Internet voting cannot be offered as an exclusive voting method. 
 Voter education campaigns, able to effectively communicate the advantages of the 
Internet voting procedure, the overall security of the system, accompanied by clear 
instructions to voters on how to vote online, are essential. 
 Choice for a decentralised Internet voting structure. 
 Recommendation for a principle-based approach to legal regulation of Internet 
voting. 
Existing research highlights the importance of citizens’ attitudes towards Internet voting for 
its successful implementation. A review of the few studies focusing on this aspect provides 
clearly insufficient information about how European citizens perceive the possibility to vote 
online. The data collected so far concerns a reduced number of countries and is often linked 
to specific pilots and lacks a comprehensive approach. A coherent enquiry on European 
citizens’ attitudes toward Internet voting is indispensable to assess the receptivity of such a 
new procedure among the general public and, most importantly, identify citizens’ main 
concerns in order to address those specific points when designing the system. 
The experience from previous contexts of e-enabled elections advises a step-by-step 
approach to the Internet voting process, with the holding of trials and a gradual 
implementation of the system. This enhances the control over each stage of the process and 
facilitates the identification of eventual deficiencies. A prudent, incremental implementation 
and diffusion of Internet voting is fundamental in this regard. 
Hence, Internet voting cannot be offered as an exclusive voting method. It remains essential 
that voters are given the possibility to participate using traditional on-paper ballots. 
Generalised scepticism towards the new procedure and the need for time in order to adapt 
to the new system, for example, might undermine participation in the first e-enabled election. 
In this regard, voter education campaigns, able to effectively communicate the advantages 
of the Internet voting procedure, the overall security of the system, accompanied by clear 
instructions to voters on how to vote online, are essential instruments to minimise problems 
stemming from the digital divide. Repeated, and information-heavy Internet voting trials may 
eventually lead to the build-up of trust, which, as several studies have shown remains the 
most crucial factor for the success of new voting technologies among its users. 
The recommendation for an incremental approach comes together with the choice for a 
decentralised Internet voting structure. Particularly at the European Union level, 
decentralising the procedure is a prolific strategy to involve the different member-states in 
the process and taking advantage of the pre-existing structures at the national level to make 
the implementation faster and more efficient. Importantly, it is also positive from a damage 
control perspective, by protecting the system against full-scale attacks which could 
jeopardise the whole procedure. The organisation and holding of elections – even European 
elections – remain national or local affairs. But the European Union can help electoral 
administrations on the road towards modernisation. For instance, the European Union may 
help member states with the development of different Internet voting scenarios (e.g. with 
different technologies, procedures, organizational set-ups) and evaluate them in the light of 
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relevant voting laws and regulations across the norm hierarchy to identify best-in-class 
solutions. Also, experts could help sketching out reforms of existing voting laws and 
regulations as a means to both enable and regulate Internet voting, with a particular focus 
on the interaction between legal and technological requirements to ensure free and secure 
suffrage. Legal approaches should be undertaken holistically and manage the interplay of law 
with technology, social norms, and other relevant factors. 
Furthermore, we would recommend a principle-based approach to legal regulation of Internet 
voting to ensure best practice implementation in a rapidly developing and improving 
technology environment. Of particular interest are comparative lenses, focusing on 
experiences and good practices in other jurisdictions, including Switzerland and Estonia, 
which have already updated their legal frameworks to enable and regulate Internet voting. 
While a focus has to be on updating existing legal and regulatory frameworks aimed at 
governing (Internet) voting, a clear link exists with other important policy areas. Digital 
signatures and identity cards or education come to mind, i.e. areas in which policies may 
become formulated in such ways as to link to Internet voting. 
From the perspective of the European Union, and in view of its next electoral rendez-vous in 
2019, European democracy would greatly benefit from the establishment of a permanent 
dialogue brining together legal experts, technologists and social scientists in order to prepare 
the future of elections through novel techniques. With Internet voting being one of them. 
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ANNEX 
1. Digital Competence - definition 
 
'Digital competence' is defined as follows: 
 
“Digital competence involves the confident and critical use of information 
Society technology (IST) for work, leisure, learning and communication. 
It is underpinned by basic skills in ICT: the use of computers to retrieve, 
access, store, produce, present and exchange information, and to 
communicate and participate in collaborative networks via the Internet. 
 
Digital competence requires a sound understanding and knowledge of 
the nature, role and opportunities of IST in everyday contexts: in 
personal and social life as well as at work. This includes main computer 
applications such as word processing, spreadsheets, databases, 
information storage and management, and an understanding of the 
opportunities and potential risks of the Internet and communication via 
electronic media (e-mail, network tools) for work, leisure, information 
sharing and collaborative networking, learning and research. Individuals 
should also understand how IST can support creativity and innovation, 
and be aware of issues around the validity and reliability of information 
available and of the legal and ethical principles involved in the interactive 
use of IST. 
 
Skills needed include the ability to search, collect and process 
information and use it in a critical and systematic way, assessing 
relevance and distinguishing the real from the virtual while recognising 
the links. Individuals should have skills to use tools to produce, present 
and understand complex information and the ability to access, search 
and use internet-based services. Individuals should also be able use IST 
to support critical thinking, creativity, and innovation. 
 
Use of IST requires a critical and reflective attitude towards available 
information and a responsible use of the interactive media. An interest 
in engaging in communities and networks for cultural, social and/or 
professional purposes also supports this competence.” (European 
Commission, 2014) 
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2. Digital Competence Framework: areas of digital competence 
 
The Digital Competence Framework contains 21 competences, which are structured according 
to 5 competence areas. The areas of digital competence are the following: 
 
 
Information identify,  locate,  retrieve,  store,  organize  and  analyze  digital 
information, judging its relevance and purpose. 
 
 
 
 
Communication communicate in digital environments, share resources through online 
tools, link with others and collaborate through digital tools, interact 
with and participate in communities and networks, cross-cultural 
awareness 
 
 
 
 
Content-creation create and edit new content (from word processing to images and 
video); integrate and re-elaborate previous knowledge and content; 
produce creative expressions, media outputs and programming; deal 
with and apply intellectual property rights and licenses. 
 
 
 
 
Safety personal  protection,  data  protection,  digital  identity  protection, 
security measures, safe and sustainable use. 
 
 
 
 
Problem-solving identify digital needs and resources, make informed decisions as to 
which are the most appropriate digital tools according to the purpose 
or need, solve conceptual problems through digital means, creatively 
use technologies, solve technical problems, update one's own and 
others' competences. 
 
 

